

The Mind's Eye



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In Defense of Stoic Fatalism

Krasimira Filcheva

The present work is an engagement with the Stoic fatalist thesis and the purported difficulty it poses for human decision-making. The main critical project envisaged here is a defense of the Stoic view against the so called “Lazy Objection,” the centerpiece of the anti-fatalist polemic, which consists in a demonstration of the alleged futility of action in the face of fate. Here, Stoic fatalism should be understood as the doctrine that everything in nature is governed by fate, construed as a “string of causes,” where every event in the chain transpires as a result of antecedent causes. Against this thesis, the “Lazy Objection” presents the argument that acceptance of the unwavering causal force of fate will leave one in a position of agential inefficacy: “if it is fated for you to recover from this illness, whether you call the doctor or not, you will recover.”¹ That is, fatalism obviates the need and rationale for human decision-making and, accordingly, action.

It is the contention of this paper that this argument is inadequate in virtue of its largely untenable assumption, namely that it is possible for human beings not to deliberate and make decisions as a result of resignation to belief in fatalism. Additionally, a positive fatalist apologetics will be advanced, centered on the claim that our situatedness *within* the “string of causes” enables us to meaningfully engage in all activity unique to human beings despite our belief in fate, for it is this situatedness that prevents us from knowing what is fated. If we do not know the ordinances of fate, then, on pain of irrationality, we ought to continue exercising our human agency in correspondence with our desires and only retrospectively judge that what has already happened must have been fated. The future viewed from our situated position within the “string of causes” is opaque and that suffices for the reconciliation of belief in fate and agential motivation.

An Outline of Stoic Fatalism

As already noted, fate, according to the Stoics, is a causal chain of things “rolling and unraveling itself through eternal sequences of cause and effect.”² The explicitly causal conception of fate that the Stoics held should at once be emphasized. On their view, if a future event X is fated to occur, it must be the case that X's causal history is to be evoked to account for why X occurs. It should be clear, then, that the Stoic conception of fate should be distinguished from theological varieties of fatalism. The latter will hold that if X is fated to occur, then that fact will be ultimately explicable by reference to the prescience of a God. On the theological fatalist thesis, to say that X is fated to occur is to be committed to the following proposition: if God knew that X will happen, then X will happen.

There is yet another fatalist view, known to the ancient schools of thought prior to the development of the characteristic Stoic position that we need to contrast with the causal doctrine of fate. Importantly akin to logical determinism, this non-theological variety of fatalism, discussed by Aristotle in his *De Interpretatione*, relies on the logical law of bivalence to demonstrate that every event is fated. Because every proposition is either true or false, every future proposition will now also be true or false, which would entail that it is necessary and fixed – either necessarily false or necessarily true.³ On this view, the fixedness of the proposition's truth-value already entails fatalism. If it is now the case that the proposition to the effect that X will occur is true, then it is necessary that X

¹ Cicero, “On Fate” *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, ed. Brad Inwood and Lloyd Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett PC, 1997), p.182.

² Cicero, “On Fate” *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, ed. Brad Inwood and Lloyd Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett PC, 1997), p.185.

³ Simplicius Comm. “On Aristotle's Categories” *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, ed. Brad Inwood and Lloyd Gerson (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett PC, 1997), p.181.

will occur. Hence X is fated to occur. The future is in some sense determined by virtue of the laws of logic. If this is the case, then, it should be evident how this conception of fate can subserve the judgment that individuals are powerless to affect the future. If X is fated to occur in virtue of logical law and it is now true that X will occur, nothing one does can change the truth-value of the proposition that X will occur.

However, the Stoic conception of fate departs significantly from this traditional fatalist thesis. What ultimately explains the fatedness of any agent-involving future event X, on the Stoic account, will be some truth about the antecedent causal conditions of this same event, that is, some present action that involves the agent. Thus X will occur *because* these present causal conditions for its occurrence obtain now. The distinction between Stoic fatalism and this variety of logical determinism should be appreciated for the Stoic theorist can properly insist that even if it is now the case that the following proposition is true: I go to the Tate Modern in London tomorrow, its truthmaker, namely my being in London tomorrow, is only consequent upon present causal conditions like my taking the plane to Britain. In other words, what explains the fact that the event is bound to occur is not the truth-value of the proposition simpliciter, but how its truth-maker is related to the present. This causal relationship is at the center of the Stoic account of fate and is what sets it apart from its fatalist predecessors. Chrysippus' response to the "Lazy Objection" should underscore the said distinction.

Chrysippus' criticism of the "Lazy Argument" aptly illustrates the core of the "co-fatedness response." He distinguishes between simple events and conjoined events where the former may involve the agent but no causally necessary antecedent to the action involves the decision-making of the agent while the latter clearly do so involve decision-making. For instance, that Socrates will die on a certain day may be a simple fated event – it will transpire, if it is indeed fated. On the other hand, if it is fated that Oedipus will be born to Laius, it is not acceptable to hold that whether Laius will lie with a woman or not, the fated event will occur.⁴ For these are "conjoined" or "co-fated," in the words of Chrysippus. To elaborate on the foregoing remarks: it is clear that the "Lazy Argument" has yielded to the fallacy of construing fate as a causal flow external to human agency.

To underscore the inapplicability of the "Lazy Argument" to the causal view of fate, we should perhaps note how logical determinism, as discussed above, may well support the view on the futility of human agency. For if the proposition about the future that Oedipus will be born to Laius is now true, and this is said to suffice for the event to be fated, then one indeed has a reason to think that whether Laius will lie with a woman or not, the event will simply occur. Naturally, the view is untenable but this can only serve the purposes of Chrysippus' co-fatedness response – accentuating the view that one's causal efficacy and agency are part of what constitutes the fatedness of future events. In what follows, I will seek to substantiate the Stoic response to the "Lazy Argument."

In Defense of Stoic Deliberation

Before embarking upon a more detailed presentation of the argument a brief mention of structure may be needed. The following claims can be profitably viewed as strands converging on the conclusion that fatalism is a defensible theoretical position: the general spirit of the co-fatedness response is largely correct yet in need of radicalization, the possibility of cessation of human decision-making in light of a belief in fate is chimerical, and our limited knowledge of the fated events in our future allows us to pursue normal human activity and deliberation as integral to our self-conception as agents. Arguably, the conjunction of the aforementioned claims suffices to establish the immunity of fatalism from the "agential inefficacy objection".

First, the need for radicalization of the co-fatedness response should become evident once we notice the following implications of the anti-fatalist position, which I will argue enmesh us in self-

⁴ Cicero, 182.

contradiction. In the manifest reaction to the fatalist proposition one exercises the peculiarly human faculty of choice *not to undertake any action*, which is itself a form of decision-making. One cannot deny one's agency by way of affirming belief in fate for one exercises that agency in the very response to fate. At the vanguard of the Stoic defense against the "Lazy Argument" should be the insistence on fatalism's innocuous implications given that one cannot cease to make choices and engage in practical reasoning and action, if one is to preserve the capacity for genuine human agency. Thus the "Lazy Argument" trades on impossibility.

It is at this juncture that potential criticism becomes relevant. For even if it is indeed the case that decisions not to act are themselves intentional actions of sorts, on the assumption that fatalism is true, it will then be the case that if one actually decides not to act one's decision not to act is also going to be fated. Hence it would not have been the case that one could have done otherwise than decide not to act. But this in itself may be seen as providing no real motivation for actually acting. However, the purpose of the present objection to the "Lazy Argument" is not to present a positive basis for motivation to deliberate in the face of fate. Rather, it is to demonstrate that following the "Lazy Argument" to its core will enmesh us in self-contradiction.

To illustrate, consider an agent's decision not to perform action X, which happens to be necessary for event Y to occur. Here, the agent's grounds for failing to perform X is the belief, standing at the core of the Lazy Argument, that X cannot make any difference as to whether Y occurs. Yet, if X does not occur, then Y cannot occur as well. But it follows that the agent's decision-making does affect the status of the future event Y after all. In other words, the agent's decision-making does affect the status of Y, in contradiction to his own belief, namely by precluding Y's occurrence. Notice, even if failing to bring about X and thus Y is itself fated, it will still be true that the agent will be taking herself not to have any effect on the status of event Y by choosing not to X. These observations concern only the belief states of the agent. It is in this sense that the agent is said to be enmeshed in a web of self-contradictions if she decides to live according to the precepts of laziness in light of fatalism's truth. The agent will be abstaining from acting because of a belief that her intentional states do not affect future outcomes. Yet, in actuality, her intentional states will be so affecting them (given the co-fatedness discussed above: if Y is to occur X has to occur first).

The foregoing remarks should press forth the impression of the non-separateness of both one's actions and omissions of actions and fate – these are inextricably intertwined. It is at this juncture that we are bound to note the incomplete nature of Chrysippus' "co-fatedness response" and the need to further expand its insights. For, guiding one's life according to fatalism-inspired laziness will inevitably put one at odds with one's standing as an agent. While one believes it to be the case that one's omissions of actions do not affect the status of events believed to be fated, it is actually the case that one's omissions of actions do so affect these events. More informally, one's belief states concerning one's agency will be utterly at odds with one's actual agency in the world.

The dictates of human agency have independent force, the realization of which should dispel the alleged dialectical burden on Stoic fatalists to vindicate effort-making. While fate may remain theoretically pertinent and constitutive of our doxastic attitudes, it cannot only be conceived as an isolated, external force that functions as a substitute for human agency. Here, the inefficaciousness of human decision-making is not occasioned by belief in fate for this inefficaciousness is bound to be illusory – whenever one presumes to be abandoning one's agential nature, one is actually acting in accordance to it; it is in this respect that the argumentation behind the "Lazy Argument" is bound to implicate us in self-contradiction within the realm of practical reasoning. For considering the following: "It is futile for me to study now or engage in the pursuit of knowledge for if everything is fated from eternity, nothing I do now makes any difference in the causal flow of pre-determined events; I will therefore not pursue my studies." But it takes little discernment for one to note the underlying contradictoriness of any such assertion. For in the act of denial of one's efficacy, one has made a decision, namely not to pursue one's studies, and has thereby made a difference in the aforementioned

causal flow – the difference between “before” and “after” the decision not to engage in study. One can only deny one's agency in one aspect but immediately and simultaneously exercise it in a different aspect.

The Irrationality of Laziness

What of a more positive counter-action to the objection from the futility of human practical effort? We are impelled towards the following claim: our knowledge of fate can only be retrospective – a natural limitation that enables us to use our full deliberative capacities and exercise goal-directed agency. For unless event X has already occurred one cannot be certain as to whether X is fated to occur. If one lacks such knowledge, then one can, with full propriety, proceed to act on one's principles, goals, ideals and reasons, and if these bring about X, then it will indeed be fated for X to occur (and vice versa). But one has no prima facie reason to discard one's agency in light of speculations on the fatedness of X. Consider the following principle that is calculated to support the foregoing contention:

*For any agent W and future, allegedly fated event X whose occurrence agent W desires, if W is not epistemically certain that X will occur, then it is not rational for W NOT to choose to act in ways that W knows will increase the likelihood that X eventually occurs.

While it should be an almost analytic truth that practical rationality entails that rational agents seek to maximize the likelihood that their goals are eventually realized by choosing to act in the relevant ways that maximize this likelihood I will briefly assume the negation of the foregoing principle. Imagine a conversation with an individual in which he presents you with the following curious combination of views: I am epistemically justified in believing that my regular readings in philosophy increase the likelihood that I will eventually go to graduate school next year; I am not certain that it is fated that I will go to graduate school next year. I will not regularly read philosophical works.

Assume, for the purposes of the example, that there are no other relevant courses of action that this individual can undertake to increase his chances of going to graduate school in a year. It should be quite plain that our intuitive reactions tell against the rationality of the above cluster of beliefs. In our evaluation of agents' efforts at practical reasoning we seem to be tacitly assuming some such principle as the one above. More importantly, given the peculiarity of our overall epistemic situation, for all expected events in our lives that involve us in one sense or another we will not be certain of their fatedness, even though in different degrees. If we apply the foregoing reasoning of this hypothetical individual to every other possible course of action that may bear on his chances for going to graduate school, then he will be abstaining from doing anything that may increase the likelihood that his goal is achieved. But the latter even more strongly convinces us of the irrationality of such approach to one's goals. It follows that if one chooses to pursue the life of laziness in earnest, with full recognition of the uncertainty in future events, one will lead a significantly irrational life.

There is one point that needs to be emphasized in order to illuminate the plausibility of the foregoing principle. Arguably, what is rational for one to believe and do will depend on one's set of background beliefs and on one's background knowledge. For instance, it may be rational for a child to wholeheartedly trust her parents for she has no reason, during her early years of childhood, to doubt their word on worldly affairs, and yet it may not be rational for the grown adult to have significant trust of her parents if she has subsequently acquired new knowledge of their tendencies to give in to religious bias, etc. What grounds the correctness of judging differently what is rational for the individual to believe in the two situations is the difference in her possession of relevant background knowledge. Hence, what one knows invariably makes a difference to what is rational for one to do and believe.

If we are to apply the conclusion we reached in the last paragraph to the case of agential efficacy in the face of fate, the following should become clear: there must be a difference between the rationality of X's choosing to be lazy despite her uncertainty that a desired future event is fated to occur and Y's choosing to be lazy in certainty that that same event is indeed fated to occur (we assume the logical possibility of someone having this certain knowledge). We can grant that the latter agent, Y, who is certain of the fatedness of the future event, has a reason not to act at all and is thus rational in not acting (contrary to the co-fatedness response, that is, for the sake of argument). But then it cannot be the case that the other agent, X, who does not have this same certain knowledge that the event is fated, is similarly rational or possesses the same degree of rationality in choosing to be lazy. Their difference in knowledge must make some difference in the reasonableness of their actions and beliefs, even if it is in some small degree. But modest as this conclusion may be, it still implies that for any ordinary individual whose future is opaque to him or her, and who is not epistemically certain that any future event is fated at all, he or she must now act in some way so as to increase the likelihood that the event occurs. This is to say that one has at least one positive reason to discard arguments for laziness despite one's belief in fatalism. Moreover, it is human rationality that so ordains.

Given our ignorance as to how intricate are the ways in which many life narratives and our own decision-making are to be mutually affected and determined, our "insider" perspective from the causal flow of fate poses a bold challenge to us – to seek the ultimately valuable in our own lives and put effort into every future-directed endeavor because ascriptions of "fatedness" to events are only meaningful for that which is already in the past. That is, for temporally situated, world-embedded, perspective-driven beings as we are.

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Smart, Williams, and Kagan on Utilitarianism

Ryan Griffith

J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams each offered an argument on the ethical theory of utilitarianism, which were featured in a seminal book on the subject, called *Utilitarianism For And Against* (henceforth abbreviated as UFA). Though both arguments are powerful, and skillfully advocated, Williams' contribution has presented a challenge for utilitarianism and consequentialism ever since. I will be summarizing key points of both Smart's and Williams' essays from this book, addressing some of the issues that utilitarianism raises for morality. After outlining Williams' essay, I will turn to Shelly Kagan's thoughts on integrity, juxtaposing them with Williams' views on the matter.

J.J.C. Smart's essay on utilitarianism opens with an introductory section specifying the nature of the theory as a non-cognitivist system. That is to say, he proposes that utilitarianism is prescriptive, and doesn't merely describe morality in terms of an agent's approval and disapproval of his actions. Smart considers actions to have a real moral status, and argues that utilitarianism is capable of determining this, and this prescribing what people ought to do in a given moral situation.

In the following section, Smart clarifies two prevalent forms of consequentialism, which are act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism can be defined as the following: the moral status of any *action* is determined by its consequences only. To act utilitarianism, the right action is that action which maximizes the overall good.¹ Rule utilitarianism states that the moral status of any action is determined by the rule which it's an instance of. So, to a rule utilitarian, that action is right which adheres to the *rule* that maximizes the overall good.

Rule utilitarianism is criticized as collapsing into act utilitarianism. This is because it is possible that the consequences of a given action following a utilitarian rule would result in sub-optimal outcomes, so the rule utilitarian may attempt to amend the rule for that specific circumstance. Continuing to amend rules to accommodate every situation with sub-optimal outcomes will eventually result in a system that is virtually identical to act utilitarianism in practice. Smart himself criticizes rule utilitarianism as "rule worship," that is, he's accusing rule utilitarianism of being more concerned with following a rule than with the outcomes of actions maximizing the good. With such a dismissal, Smart argues that that in order to truly maximize overall good, rule utilitarianism would have to follow only one rule: "maximize probable benefit."

From there, Smart goes forth to distinguish between two historically prevalent categories, hedonistic and non-hedonistic utilitarianism. He further splits non-hedonistic utilitarianism into the sub-categories of ideal and quasi-ideal utilitarianism. British philosopher Jeremy Bentham was a proponent of hedonistic utilitarianism, and his interpretation was that the right action maximizes pleasure (and minimizes pain) specifically. Smart classified G.E. Moore as an ideal utilitarian, because he thought that certain states of mind have a separate, intrinsic value. A higher pleasure would be philosophy, for instance, because it contained certain intrinsically good qualities. John Stuart Mill was what Smart refers to as a quasi-ideal utilitarian, wherein he still advocated the maximization of pleasure, but divided pleasures into higher and lower orders. That is, pursuing pleasures of the mind was an intrinsically better pleasure than pursuing pleasures of the flesh. Both Mill and Moore attributed intrinsic value to pleasure, but Mill took the extra step of creating the higher order/lower order distinction.

¹ Although I use the term "good" here, utilitarianism, depending on the variant, may require the maximization of overall good, happiness, pleasure, or benefit.

Smart acknowledges that the meta-ethical differences between Bentham and Mill may not ordinarily result in a difference in the outcome of a situation, i.e., the hedonist and non-hedonist may well choose to take the same action under the same circumstances. However, because of the meta-ethical motivations of the hedonist and non-hedonist differ, it is possible that an outcome could be different. Imagine a person could either choose to spend an afternoon sitting on the couch, eating junk food and watching war movies, or this person could read the works of the great philosophers (or poetry, or listen to symphonies), adding depth and richness to his/her life and experiences. Let's assume that either activity would result in a high degree of happiness for the agent. Mill would argue that the study of philosophy (or poetry or music) is a pleasure with an intrinsically higher value than eating junk food and watching war movies, even if these activities resulted in the same amount of pleasure for the agent. Given this, it's not impossible to imagine that a hedonist may choose a different action than a non-hedonist.

Smart then references experiments conducted on rats (UFA, pp. 18-19), where their brains were electrically stimulated to induce pleasure. After conditioning, the rats were allowed to actuate the lever which delivered the stimulation, and did so for hours, neglecting activities like eating. If able, would humans be reduced to spending all of their leisure hours flipping a switch to trigger various pleasure responses in their brains, eschewing the actual activities themselves?² If so, why would this be bad? Those who believe that certain pleasures have intrinsic value would argue that such a situation would indeed be bad, and because it's the nature of the activity from which the pleasure is derived that is part of what makes it intrinsically valuable. That is, the pleasure sensation alone isn't what makes it valuable.

The next section in Smart's entry is regarding negative utilitarianism. Negative utilitarianism states that not only does the right action consist of maximizing overall good, but also of minimizing overall suffering. Smart stipulates that suffering must comprise pain, not just displeasure or discontent. Smart then claims that negative utilitarianism could lead to "curious" consequences, since a negative utilitarian could be in favor of exterminating humanity as a solution to minimize suffering (UFA p.29). It seems to me that this claim of his is rather dubious, as it conflates the *minimization* of suffering with the *elimination* of it. Exterminating the human race would likely cause a great deal of suffering, if only psychological (assuming that one could painlessly kill everyone on earth), so it would be difficult to claim that suffering would be minimized. Additionally, exterminating all of humanity would eliminate any potential good that humans could bring about, which would pull the calculation in the opposite direction. Suffice to say, I don't think Smart's claim that favoring human extermination follows from the doctrine of negative utility.

Smart's section on rightness and wrongness of actions is substantial, and covers a good deal of territory. He begins by stating the act utilitarian doctrine:

"...the only reason for performing an action A rather than alternative action B is that by doing A will make mankind... happier than will doing B. ...doing A will produce more probable benefit than will doing B (UFA p. 30)."

Smart then describes his intended audience as "sympathetic and benevolent men," who are favorable towards human happiness. He then states that since these men are human, they will be motivated by "purely selfish attitudes." He follows this by stating that if everyone looks after their own interests, the general happiness will be promoted. I can't help but wonder how Smart reconciles the characteristics of sympathy, benevolence, and selfishness. I also have to disagree with his argument that general happiness will result from each individual pursuing their own in-

² Smart draws such a picture on p. 19, which Williams later refers to as "brain-electrode man."

terest. One can imagine a case where two peoples' interests conflict, and so only one of their happiness can result, at the most, and perhaps even nullify each others' happiness. Admittedly, it may be a lack of understanding on my part, but I fail to see how everyone will benefit when each individual looks out for themselves. It seems to me that if the benefit of the most people is the desired result, then each person should seek to advance that goal, instead of, or at least in addition to, their own self-interests. Smart does touch upon this, noting that if the above sympathetic and benevolent men's selfish attitudes are not "in harmony with the general happiness," then their activities would cancel each other out, which is not an outcome which a utilitarian could rationally consider.

Next Smart addresses the issue of equity, i.e., the distribution of happiness. He disagrees with Rawls on fairness, asserting that we "may often" find ourselves in the position of having to inflict pain or suffering on a completely innocent person in order to achieve the maximal general happiness. Although it appears that in the capacity that Smart was referencing Rawls (UFA, p.37),³ Rawls was arguing that distributing happiness as fairly as possible is a matter of justice. In this section Smart is dealing with equity, but put the matter of justice on the shelf, thereby side-stepping what Rawls was likely going after. Smart argues that while fairness can be one criterion that a utilitarian uses to evaluate an action, it is not the only one, and it is not an inviolable rule.

Finally Smart addresses utilitarianism and justice. He gives an account of a thought experiment wherein a small-town sheriff can only prevent a deadly riot by framing an innocent man, who the angry mob mistakenly thinks is guilty of something (Smart doesn't elaborate on this detail). Moreover, the sheriff knows that by framing the innocent man, he will surely be executed as punishment. On the other hand, if the sheriff doesn't frame the innocent man, the angry mob will riot, killing hundreds of people. In such a case, the utilitarian would calculate that the sheriff ought to frame the innocent man, resulting in his death, but preventing the death of hundreds of others who would have perished in the riot. Smart admits that in order to maintain a utilitarian stance, the utilitarian would have to accept an unjust punishment in this experiment. To do otherwise, i.e., to conclude that the sheriff should not frame the man, resulting in a deadly riot, would cause the utilitarian to abandon his doctrine. Smart appears forced (UFA pp. 69-72)⁴ to argue that, no matter how unfortunate a fact it is, a utilitarian cannot always choose a just action. It is notable that Smart does not address the concept of justice in any meaningful way, but only concludes that justice and utilitarianism are sometimes incompatible, sometimes not. Smart himself hopes that the majority of situations are harmonious with justice, but (with due credit to him for his consistency and integrity) accepts that it is possible that some situations may regrettably not be so. Justice here is reduced, possibly to no more than a superstitious rule that ought not be included in the utilitarian's scientific calculations.

Smart concludes with his recommendation of utilitarianism's appeal, that being its flexibility and its scientific-minded basis on empirical evaluation of possible outcomes. In the end he admits that even utilitarianism's flexibility is a matter of utility, not justification.

³ Smart was citing Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, Philosophical Review 67 (1958)

⁴ Here Smart is using a brief article by H.J. McCloskey to flesh out the consequences of his experiment. McCloskey's one page "note on utilitarian punishment" is powerful and decisive in its criticism of utilitarianism and justice, and Smart admits that a utilitarian cannot consistently adhere to a justice "rule" if a just action would not bring about maximum overall benefit.

Bernard Williams' essay critiquing utilitarianism begins with his thesis, that he wants to attack utilitarianism as "a distinctive way of looking at human action and morality." He nicely frames the aim of much of philosophy in one of the most insightful sentences of the entire book,

"The first question for philosophy is not 'do you agree with utilitarianism's answer,' but 'do you really accept utilitarianism's way of looking at the question?'" (UFA p. 78)"

Williams describes Smart's consequentialist system as eudaimonistic and direct. Eudaimonia is a classical Greek term commonly translated as happiness, so he is indicating that the utilitarianism that Smart is advocating is hedonistic, or primarily concerned with human pleasure. He maintains that Smart's system is direct due to the value of the morality being attached directly to actions, not to rules, practices, or anything else that is not immediately related to the consequences of that action. Departing from Smart, he substitutes *direct consequentialism* for act utilitarianism, and *indirect consequentialism* for rule utilitarianism, because he is concerned with direct and indirect value of actions. Williams also quickly points out that the concept of justice is one which causes utilitarianism "particular discomfort," which is illustrative of his forthright and dry-witted evaluations of ideas he finds disagreeable. He also mentions that he will focus on personal integrity, that being the alienation of an agent from his actions and what Williams calls his "projects." Williams asserts that because utilitarianism cannot make sense of human desire and actions, it cannot make sense of happiness, which is supposed to be the entire foundation of what a hedonistic (or eudaimonistic) utilitarianism is concerned with.

Williams discusses utilitarianism's structure in the next section, and tries to determine whether the utilitarian places value in actions or in sensations. He determines that utilitarianism must see sensations, i.e., pleasure, as deriving from actions. That is, humans derive pleasure from an action or activity because of something about that action; an activity is often enjoyed for its own sake. Utilitarianism requires that we do whatever is necessary of us to bring about the better or best state of affairs possible given the situation, and Williams suggests that the evaluation of what the best state of affairs would be is determined from an abstract point of view.

In his criticism of negative responsibility, Williams begins to outline his main attack on consequentialism, which is that it takes away the agent's integrity, and that it alienates the agent from his/her actions and projects. Negative responsibility is the idea that an agent is responsible for the outcome of his/her actions as well as actions he/she chooses not to perform. Williams then describes two thought experiments to flesh out his argument. The two examples involve agents, George the chemist and Jim the botanist (UFA, pp. 97-99). Both cases put the agents in situations where in order to perform the best action by utilitarian standards, they would have to compromise a personal conviction. In George's case, he'd have to engage in chemical and biological weapons research, which he disagrees with, and in Jim's case, he'd have to kill an unarmed Indian (Williams' term), who it seems did nothing to warrant execution. Williams argues that, as illustrated by these experiments, utilitarianism cannot make sense of integrity because it also can't make sense of the relations between persons and their actions and projects. Much is made of the concept of a person's projects, so consideration of just what Williams means by the term project. Though he never explicitly provides a definition, his use of the term, as well as his specification of commitments as a *kind* of project, give us a closer look. A commitment is a more fundamental sort of project, one that a person is deeply involved with, and it points to that person's convictions and their identity.

To the point, Williams argues that to say that Jim is responsible for making Pedro (the officer in charge of the executions) kill the Indians is to alienate Pedro from his actions, removing him from his intentions and projects, and reducing him to a mere medium through which Jim

acts. In Williams' eyes, this is tantamount to alienating Pedro from his very identity. The deaths of the twenty Indians may have come about from something related to what Jim refused to do, but Williams doesn't think that this is the same as saying that Jim *made* Pedro kill the Indians. If one of Pedro's projects was to execute the Indians (according to Williams' example, this was because they protested the government, and the executions were to serve as a threat and warning to prevent future protests) because he is loyal to the government (which we can assume is rather totalitarian), then those were *his own* intentions and his own project. We would not likely conclude that Jim is somehow responsible for Pedro's intentions or inclinations to use violence as a means of enforcing a political policy, yet the consequentialist is prepared to hold Jim responsible for Pedro killing (or ordering the deaths of) the Indians in this instance, which abstracts Pedro from what he had heretofore planned on doing whether Jim had arrived, or had even existed at all.

It is absurd, Williams insists, to require a person to set aside their commitments in favor of others' commitments or projects. If commitments are a reflection of the deepest convictions a person has, and that commitment's projects and activities flow from the intentions, principles and values that make that person who they are, then to detach them from those commitments is to literally attack their integrity, according to Williams.

Turning to Shelly Kagan's thoughts on the matter of integrity and projects (Kagan, pp. 390-3), one finds that he does not exactly flatly deny all of what Williams argues. Kagan admits that integrity is a value that people can hold, but it is put as a status of no more importance than any other value, and one that is not insuperable; it can be outweighed by countervailing circumstances. He takes a different stance on integrity and projects, even fundamental projects (I take this to be Kagan's terminology for "commitments"), and it points towards a different paradigm than Williams, and so to a great extent, the two are essentially talking past one another. Kagan does not place as much of nor the same kind of importance on the concepts, and very consistently argues that an agent is still morally required to do that action which promotes the overall good, even if it will severely damage the agent's integrity and projects. Kagan's extremist (a strict consequentialist) must be willing to make whatever sacrifices the promotion of overall good requires of him, regardless of how much suffering or unhappiness it may cause himself, and so his integrity and commitments are always potentially on the chopping block. He also argues that most people don't truly value integrity, as they are unwilling to examine or correct inconsistencies in their moral beliefs, and thus he attempts to blunt the strength of Williams' attack.⁵

Kagan's solution for the dilemma of fundamental projects conflicting with promoting the good is for people to change their priorities so that promoting the good becomes their fundamental project, and all other interests and projects would properly defer to that end. Although acknowledging that such a drastic change would be quite difficult for most people, Kagan insists it is the only way that a person can retain a harmony between their moral code and their personal integrity. This obviously infers, and he explicitly states in his book, that the consequentialism is the only coherent and consistent moral code, and the only one which can adequately justify its actions and means of making decisions.

Like so many issues in philosophy and ethics, finding a consensus on the truth of the matter can be difficult, if not virtually impossible. All of the arguments for and against consequen-

⁵ Another frequent tactic of Kagan's seems to be to argue that the non-consequentialist has failed to provide a compelling argument or adequate evidence for their position, and he thereby places the burden of proof squarely on the "moderate (i.e., non-consequentialist)." This shifting of the burden of proof may be questionable, at least in some instances.

tialism I've presented came from the minds of eminent philosophers, yet no single argument was able to conclusively discharge the others. Each of these philosophers knows it is critical to present a consistent and coherent theory, and each argument and response was thorough and persuasive. At the end of the day, it may be the case that morality is not a simple issue to resolve; moral matters are complex and messy, and it may be difficult to utilize a single, unified theory to resolve every situation that we're confronted with. As the difference of opinion between Williams and Kagan on the matter of integrity illustrates, people can, and often do, see morality from completely different points of view. Although it's the role of philosophers, and indeed all of us, to continue to critically evaluate our moral beliefs and theories, it could prove to be a very long time before a definitive answer or a unified ethical theory is reached.

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No Good Then No God? An Inquiry Into William Lane Craig's Moral Argument.

Nathan Herbert

“Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?”
-Socrates¹

In addition to his metaphysical and scientific arguments for the existence of God, William Lane Craig employs a moral argument. This syllogism is arguably his most popular as it requires little philosophic or scientific training to grasp and is thus readily available to the masses. Irrespective of the argument from moral objectivity's appeal, however, I contend that while the argument may be valid in form, it is unsound and does not provide evidence in support of God's existence. The standard form of Craig's argument is as follows:

1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
2. Objective moral values do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.

Craig offers a precise definition of objective morals to supplement the argument. When he uses the phrase, he is specifically referring to moral values which are, “valid and binding whether anybody believes in them or not.”²

Craig's support of the first premise is not from positive evidence but rather an inference from a process of elimination. For instance, he rules out cultural evolution as a force from which objective morals could arise. Similarly, he dismisses any pseudo-Platonist views of objective morals, which hold that they simply exist in the realm of the forms. Indeed, after having dismissed several other potential objective moral value generators, Craig settles upon the divine as the only legitimate source.

The second premise of the argument from moral objectivity is supported by an even less structured argument. Craig's defense of the argument takes the form of assertion more often than evidential proof. For instance, he claims that “objective values *do exist*, and deep down we all know it.” (emphasis in original)³ He proceeds to liken the denial of this claim to solipsism and other denials of the physical reality. In an interesting move Craig also makes a Cartesian-esque declaration by stating that, “we know objective moral values exist because we clearly apprehend some of them.”⁴ However, Craig does little else beyond relying on his audiences' intuitions on the subject to support the second premise.

Clearly, the conclusion of the argument follows in form from the premises. It is interesting nonetheless to note that although the argument actually has to do work in order to support the existence of objective morals it ends by claiming the existence of something else entirely! Although the specifics of which God is being proven is left ambiguous for the time, Craig believes that objective morals both exist and offer compelling evidence in favor of God's existence.

¹ Plato. *Euthyphro*. 10a.

² Craig, William Lane. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. *God?* Oxford University Press. 2004. Pg. 17.

³ Ibid. Pg. 18.

⁴ Craig, William Lane. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. *God?* Oxford University Press. 2004. Pg. 21..

I.

My initial criticism of the argument rests with the first premise. Craig needs to claim (and does) in this argument that objective moral values exist in the same way as mathematical truths do. Indeed, to fulfill the definition that he posits of objective moral values this must be the case. However, to do so commits Craig to fall upon one of the horns of the *Euthyphro* dilemma.

While he is very specific about what systems cannot be responsible for objective moral values, Craig does little to parse the relationship that God allegedly shares with them. Specifically, he does not make clear whether God's having decreed something objectively moral renders it so or whether objective moral values are just that and God shares in them. To put the point more eloquently I turn to Leibniz who summarized this dilemma by asking, "But there remains the question whether it is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good and just".⁵

Craig does not pay tribute to this dilemma in his work and it is thus unclear which horn of the dilemma he takes. However, I believe it is a charitable rendering of his stance to assume that he is a divine command theory theist. That is, he believes that objective moral values are objectively moral because God commands them. Otherwise, God would not be necessary, in the argument, objective moral values wouldn't be, "valid and binding whether anybody believes in them or not", and Craig would lose his proof.⁶

There are distinct problems with this stance. Presumably God has reasons for commanding certain moral values objective. However, without access to these reasons, or any proof that they exist, its will becomes the *de facto* moral standard. Objective moral values then appear rather arbitrary. Similarly, this arbitrariness applies to God. In fact, there is no logical contradiction apparent in the assumption that God need not have reasons for his commands. It appears then that God could arbitrarily command certain moral values to be objective in direct contradiction to the idea of God that Craig has which always acts for good reasons. Would these arbitrary commands be, "valid and binding whether anybody believes in them or not"?⁷ Craig thinks so. Again Leibniz summarizes the dilemma with characteristic eloquence: "Where will be his justice and his wisdom if he has only a certain despotic power, if arbitrary will takes the place of reasonableness...?"⁸

It follows from the aforementioned problem of arbitrariness that God could command anything. In fact, there is no act too horrible, too gruesome, or too evil that God could not only command but could codify as objectively moral. For instance, it is plausible that God could decree pedophilia objectively moral. The problem simply put is that anything could be made good or bad, right or wrong, upon the capricious whims of a deity tied only to arbitrariness.

Similarly, it follows from the potential for arbitrary moral values that God's commands lack authority. Commands in and of themselves do not create obligation. For instance, my shouting at a platoon of Marines does not obligate their cooperation. However, if the commander has authority, like a drill sergeant, then the marines have sufficient obligation to adhere to commands. But, command authority cannot itself be based in the ability to command, to claim otherwise requires circular logic. It appears logical then to suppose that God's command authority must derive from a source other than its will. This is a dire problem for the

⁵ Leibniz. *Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice*. 1702.

⁶ Craig, William Lane. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. *God?* Oxford University Press. 2004. Pg. 17.

⁷ Craig, William Lane. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. *God?* Oxford University Press. 2004. Pg. 17.

⁸ Leibniz. *Discourse of Metaphysics*. 1686

theist in general and for Craig specifically because it then appears that objective moral values can exist without God because the authority to decree them comes from elsewhere.

Forgetting the problem of command authority for the moment, however, further concerns arise for Craig's position. What does it actually mean, upon Craig's brand of theism, to say that God is morally good (as Craig often claims)? Merely that God obeys its own commands? Or as William P. Alston wrote, "God practices what he preaches, whatever that might be."⁹ This seems to be far less than the theist wants to be able to attribute to their deity. Indeed, it would appear that the answer would amount to nothing more than a simple tautology- God wills what God wills.

The final challenge that I will pose to Craig's first premise is the potential for objective moral values existence unrelated to God. There is no logical contradiction inherent or necessary in the conception of objective moral values existing in a Platonic realm of the forms. I do not find this possibility terribly compelling, as I am not a Platonist with respect to morality, however, the objection seems worth noting. Irrespective of my lack of confidence in the challenge I am left to wonder where Craig thinks that objective moral values literally exist. In the mind of God? I suspect that whatever the answer, it will be no more troubling than supposing the realm of the forms.

II.

The second premise of Craig's argument from moral objectivity is no less troubling than the first. My first concern is aforementioned ambiguity. Where do objective moral values exist? For Craig to arrive at the second premise and retain his distinct brand of theism he necessarily must endorse the notion that nonphysical realities literally exist. I am, however, unaware of any realities' existence that are not physical in nature. That is, realities that are not of specific times, places, and objects composed of fundamental physical particles do not seem to literally exist. If objective moral values exist then they would be an exception to this rule. The contradiction is apparent. Thus it seems reasonable to hold that objective moral values do not literally exist in the way that Craig needs them to.

Moreover, to address Craig's work specifically it seems that the evidence supporting objective moral values that, "deep down we all know it" is incorrect.¹⁰ Craig is explicitly relying on the intuitions and basic opinions of his audience for support. However, individuals and groups of people disagree widely about what actions or values are right and wrong. That is to say that the intuitions in question would be radically different depending on the particular folks in the audience.

This disagreement stands in stark contrast to the nearly unanimous acceptance of objective mathematical truths that subsist across cultures, continents, languages, and every other human division. For instance, two plus two equals four in every corner of the globe. That axiom is "valid...whether anybody believes in [it] or not".¹¹ However, it cannot be said that keeping idols is morally wrong in the analogously relevant sense. Even if an *a priori* proof weren't available to demonstrate $2 + 2 = 4$ it would seem reasonable to assume that our intuitions support the notion. Dissimilarly, the vast disagreement amongst ourselves with respect to morality cannot be said to act as supporting evidence. It seems reasonable to assume that if objective

⁹ Alston, William P. *What Euthyphro Should Have Said*. Pg. 285

¹⁰ Craig, William Lane. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. *God?* Oxford University Press. 2004. Pg. 17.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 17.

moral values did in fact exist there would be considerably less disagreement amongst people about what they are.

Of course disagreement alone does not necessarily rule out the possibility of objective moral values. That would be far too strong a claim to make. However, it seems, at least on the face of it, that disagreement should count as some evidence against the type of values Craig needs. This is again because the intuitions that Craig is relying on for support are vastly different. For instance- the intuitions of a Pagan, a Muslim, a Quaker, and a Satanist with respect to what if any moral values are objective very widely. I doubt Craig would be able to make the case he has employed here given that audience and come to the same conclusion.

It seems to me that little else need be said regarding the second premise. The widespread disagreement with respect to objective moral values seems to count as evidence against their existence or at least as a weakening parameter to Craig's appeal to intuition. Moreover, the nonphysical status that Craig appoints to objective moral values also seems to count as evidence against their existence insofar as it precludes their existence. The notion that objective moral values exist then, while supported by Craig's intuitions, seems to be questionable without saying anything of their detail or implications.

III.

Without further explanation from Craig regarding the role that his God plays in moral objectivity it is hard to say anything too meaningful about the conclusion. Again, while the argument form is valid, its soundness is in question. What, for instance, does the argument tell us about God? Without any positive explanatory force I find the argument to be both unsatisfying and ineffective in its intended goal.

For Craig to use the argument from moral objectivity as evidence for the existence of God effectively I believe that he must answer certain specific questions with respect to the criticisms I have raised. Which horn of the *Euthyphro* dilemma will he commit himself to? What of the arbitrariness that this position would entail of both God and objective moral values? Where does God's command authority derive from and what prevents it from being used to command anything? What meaning is there, with respect to a divine command theorist's view, in the claim that God is morally good? Where do objective moral values literally exist? And lastly, why is there such widespread disagreement over moral values in contrast to the near unanimity of opinion with respect to mathematical and scientific axioms? Without answers to those and similar questions I feel confident in contending that while the argument may be valid in form, it is unsound and does not provide evidence in support of God's existence.

A Compatibilist Account of Moral Responsibility and Determinism

Dainia Jabaji

In the debate on free will, one of the most fundamental questions being asked is: Can we still hold people morally responsible for their actions if the world is completely determined? Compatibilists hold that even in an absolutely deterministic world, we can still be justified in praising and blaming others for their actions, while incompatibilists do not think that moral responsibility can survive in a deterministic world since one could not have the ability to do otherwise in any given situation. In this paper, I will propose an account of moral responsibility that can be held constant even in a deterministic world. I will also state how moral responsibility does not *justify* praise or blame but *allows* it, and furthermore, I will suggest how we *can* be justified in our praise and blame of others in a deterministic world.

To start, one must realize that a very important role is played by intuitions in the debate about moral responsibility and determinism. Philosophers often create thought experiments to figure out what people mean by specific terms or concepts, or just to uncover their intuitions about when they believe those terms or concepts are justified. But how important are intuitions when it comes to things like moral responsibility? Intuitions play a major role in deciding whether or not someone should be held morally responsible for their actions, since much of ordinary morality is based on intuitions. To make matters difficult, it turns out that in the case of moral responsibility and determinism people have mixed intuitions; some of the time people are incompatibilists about the two, and some of the time they are compatibilists.

Shaun Nichols of the University of Utah and Joshua Knobe of Princeton University conducted a series of studies that showed that people's responses to questions about moral responsibility can vary dramatically depending on the way in which the question is formulated. Essentially the results showed that when asked questions that trigger emotions, people had compatibilist intuitions but when asked questions that called for a more abstract sort of cognition, people had incompatibilist intuitions. Thus, the results of these studies have led to more questions. Are people's emotions getting in the way of their being able to see the truth or are emotions important in studying moral responsibility?

It is not unreasonable to think that emotions play a main role in attributing moral responsibility to people. Emotions actually seem to be a *necessary* aspect of assigning moral responsibility to people, and furthermore, motivating people to act morally. Consider a person with no compassion, no sympathy, nor any other emotions about people. When presented with a case involving morality, they would not be able to assign unbiased moral responsibility to people, or even understand what morality is. Our emotions or reactive attitudes are a sort of tool to assist us in assigning moral responsibility, or a signal that we should do so. Through experiencing emotions like sympathy, we are better able to understand others and show that we do. Emotions like sympathy also motivate us to act morally, which seems fairly obvious. This explains why ads that attempt to persuade people to give to charities draw on the audience's emotions by presenting sad images and facts. So, it is clear that emotions can motivate people to act morally and help people to correctly attribute moral responsibility to others. Since

emotions are necessary for correct moral judgment, and judgments of praise and blame are moral judgments, it seems that compatibilists intuitions about cases that are affect-centered might be justified.

Despite the differences in intuitions between people and even within an individual himself, intuitions (even if it cannot be determined *why* we have those intuitions) definitely play an important role in trying to figure out if we can have moral responsibility in a completely deterministic world.

One intuition that many people have is that you have to be determined by something natural, and not manipulated or determined by something synthetic, in order to be morally responsible. My account of moral responsibility includes this property as a basic requirement in order for the person to be even considered morally responsible for their action. This type of moral responsibility can still exist in a deterministic world. My account of moral responsibility incorporates much of John Martin Fischer's aspects of moral responsibility as well, and goes as follows: In order to be morally responsible, 1) action A must be deemed morally relevant according to ordinary morality, 2) agent X must want to perform action A, 3) agent X must be a rational being, 4) agent X's want must be brought about by his/her own, naturally-given reasons responsive mechanism, and 5) agent X must perform action A.

The first condition for moral responsibility, that action A must be deemed morally relevant according to ordinary morality, just means that action A must have some sort of moral or ethical bearing. This is necessary, for suppose 'action A' was 'brushing your teeth', something with seemingly no connection to morality (unless you consider someone's harsh breath morally offensive); it seems that at least shallowly one would not be *morally* responsible for this act, just *causally* responsible.

The fifth condition for moral responsibility, that the agent must perform the morally relevant action, is very understandable as well, for if the agent does not perform the action, there is no reason to ask if the agent is morally responsible in performing that action.

The third condition for moral responsibility, that the agent must be a rational being, seems obviously true. If a tree falls on a man's house and causes \$22,000 of damage to it, that tree cannot be held morally responsible for this act, but it can be held causally responsible. If it is not already obvious why the tree is not morally responsible, one might be able to see why based on my other conditions namely that the tree does not want to fall on the house and the tree does not have a naturally-given reasons responsive mechanism. Another reason being rational is vital for moral responsibility is that human's, or rational beings, have higher order thinking and are able to think of the consequences of their actions, and how they might effect others- an important aspect of morality.

The second and fourth condition for moral responsibility, that agent X must want to perform action A and that want must be brought about using the agent's own, naturally-given reasons responsive mechanism can be shown to be necessary for moral responsibility as well. The intuition that these conditions must be met is demonstrated in Derek Pereboom's Four Case Argument. Pereboom points to determinism for the generation of our intuition that the main character, Professor Plum, is not morally responsible in case 1, but Alfred Mele shows that this is in fact not what is causing our

intuitions. I am suggesting that my second and fourth condition for moral responsibility is what is causing these intuitions.

Pereboom's Four Case Argument is presented as four cases that are supposed to meet all the compatibilist's conditions for free will, while showing that if you think that the agent in the first case is not free, then you should think the agent in the fourth case is not free as well, because in every case Professor Plum (the agent) is causally determined to perform a certain action, namely, killing Ms. White. In the first case, Professor Plum was created by neuroscientists who manipulate him to undertake the process of reasoning that eventually causes him to kill Ms. White. If Professor Plum wanted to kill Ms. White, he wanted to want to kill Ms. White, and he met all the other compatibilist conditions for free will. In the fourth case Professor Plum was an ordinary man determined by the past and the laws of nature to kill Ms. White. Everything in the four cases remains consistent other than the manipulation that existed in case one fades out until in case four when Professor Plum is only determined by the past and the laws of nature.

Pereboom is right in that if we think causal determinism is the reason why Professor Plum is not morally responsible in the first case, then we should think he is not morally responsible in the fourth case. However, many people do not have the intuition that Professor Plum is morally responsible in the fourth case. Because of this intuition, Alfred Mele has come up with a way to show that it is not in fact causal determinism that is forming our intuition that Plum is not responsible in the first two cases, and so it seems that there is not a requirement for us to have the same intuitions about case four as case one. Mele's logic is that if causal determinism is causing our intuitions that Plum is not morally responsible for his action in case one, then it would seem like if you took out the causal determinism, we should have the intuition that Plum can be held morally responsible for his action. Mele creates a case just like case one but in which causal determinism is not true, and shows that we still have the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible. Thus, according to Mele, it is not causal determinism per se that is causing our intuition that he is not free.

So what *is* causing our intuition that Plum is not free in case one, but free in case four? Some like to point to manipulation. The problem is it seems that manipulation involves intent, or some sort of goal, and hypothetical situations can be constructed in which a person is being controlled by a computer with no intent and many compatibilists still get the intuition that that person is not free or morally responsible for their actions. So it cannot simply be added to the compatibilists account of moral responsibility that the agent not be manipulated, it seems they must include something about the agent having their own *naturally-given* reasons responsive mechanism. By having a "naturally-given" reasons responsive mechanism, I mean having a mechanism that you were born with, that was handed down to you through your DNA or through other processes that contribute to decision making. This mechanism may not be artificial in that it must not be created by someone else, or belong to someone else. This is where my second and fourth condition for moral responsibility come into play, that agent X must want to perform the action, and that want must be brought on by their own, naturally-given, reasons responsive mechanism. This can explain why we have the intuition that Professor Plum is not free in case one and in case two; his reasons responsive mechanism is synthetic, and not naturally-given, whereas in case four, it is.

But why should one care whether or not a person's reasons responsive mechanism is their own and naturally-given? Well, first of all it seems that is just what makes a person herself. If a neurosurgeon put a chip in agent X's brain to make them reason differently, it could be argued that that person would not be agent X any more, and so agent X should not be held morally responsible for any actions she performs after the chip is in her brain, since it is not her who is reasoning whether or not to perform that action.

Even if it cannot be explained why it is important whether a person's reasons responsive mechanism is theirs or not, there may just be a morally relevant difference between the two. To show that there could simply be a morally relevant difference between whether a person's reasons responsive mechanism is naturally-given or not, I will try to present two parallel cases. If it turns out that we have different moral judgments about the cases, and in the cases the only difference between the two can be attributed to a moral difference between having a naturally-given reasons responsive mechanism and having a non-naturally-given reasons responsive mechanism per se, then it must be concluded that there is simply a morally relevant difference between the two. I have argued that Pereboom has already non-intentionally demonstrated this in his Four Case Argument but consider my two cases:

Case 1: In a completely deterministic world, there is a woman named Cindy, who has an average naturally-given reasons responsive mechanism, which was produced by her lessons learned growing up. Because of the past and the laws of nature, Cindy was determined to have that certain reasons responsive mechanism, and was determined to have those childhood experiences that caused her reasons responsive mechanism to develop. Yesterday, Cindy was walking by a river when she saw a child drowning. Cindy is a caring individual but she was also busy and on her way to the store to get supplies for a party she was having later that day. The store would be closed in ten minutes, and if she stopped, she would not be able to make it to the store. As it turns out she decided to not save the drowning child based on her reasoning using her own, naturally-given reasons responsive mechanism.

Case 2: In a completely deterministic world, there is a woman named Marge, who at a young age had a chip fall out of the sky and land in her brain. This was a complete freak accident, and the chip was not put in her brain for any reason. However, the chip is programmed as its own reasons responsive mechanism. This chip manifests itself in Marge's brain, and will serve as Marge's only reasons responsive mechanism from that point on. Because of the past and the laws of nature, Marge was determined to have this chip land in her brain and have this certain programmed reasons responsive mechanism. Yesterday, Marge was walking by a river when she saw a child drowning. Marge is a caring individual but she was also busy and on her way to the store to get supplies for a party she was having later that day. The store would be closed in ten minutes, and if she stopped, she would not be able to make it

to the store. As it turns out she decided to not save the drowning child based on the reasoning done by this artificial reasons responsive mechanism.

Since taking a poll on the majority of people's intuitions about these two cases is not possible right now, it is hard to actually say what those intuitions will be. I believe that people will have the intuition that Cindy can be held morally responsible in the first case, while Marge cannot be held morally responsible in the second. If this is true then one would have to conclude that there is just a morally relevant difference between having your own, naturally-given reasons responsive mechanism, and having a non-naturally-given reasons responsive mechanism. If it turns out that people do not have such intuitions, then my conditions for what it takes to be morally responsible will not be justified.

An objection to the view that an agent's reason responsive mechanism must be their own naturally-given one is given by another student, Frank Mann, in conversation. He writes:

Whether an individual's reasons-responsive mechanism has been brought about as the result of a learned process or by mere accident is morally irrelevant if the functioning of the mechanism is determined (i.e. if the agent is still determined). If the agent is determined and could not have done otherwise then the agent cannot be considered physically free and subsequently is not morally responsible for their action. Furthermore, whether the mechanism is considered "natural" or "artificial" is morally irrelevant unless "artificial" implies that the mechanism is not their own. Certainly an agent's action must be brought about by a mechanism that is their own in order for them to be morally responsible for their actions/choices but this is not all that is required. In addition to the agent's action being brought about by a mechanism that is their own they also must possess a genuine ability or power to do otherwise (and this entails the metaphysical possibility of different futures obtaining, which is a possibility that is ruled out by causal determinism). If an agent is unable to do otherwise (i.e. is determined) then they cannot be thought to possess a genuine ability to do otherwise and subsequently cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.

While Frank Mann holds a view that most incompatibilists hold, he is merely begging the question. He also assumes that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise when objecting to my claim that it might not if people's intuitions show otherwise. This is like a person arguing for the claim that baking a cake does not require eggs, and someone objecting to the claim by saying that it does but not showing that the first person's reasoning or arguments are false. They are objecting to it simply by saying it is not true.

Furthermore, he states that it is "irrelevant whether or not the mechanism is considered 'natural' or 'artificial' unless artificial implies that the mechanism is not their own. However, this is exactly what I mean by 'artificial'.

If it turns out that there is just a morally relevant difference between having your own naturally-given reasons responsive mechanism or not, then the five conditions are justified and met, and agent X can now be held morally responsible for her action. By her being able to be held morally responsible, I mean that people are now allowed to attribute blame or praise to her for performing action A. Note, that this does not *justify* one in attributing praise or blame to her, but *allows* them to. Just like when I turned eighteen, I was given the right to smoke cigarettes under the NYS law, or I was *allowed* to smoke cigarettes, but just because I turned eighteen doesn't mean I *should* smoke cigarettes, or in other words turning eighteen doesn't *justify* me smoking cigarettes. If on my eighteenth birthday I decided to smoke and someone asked me "why are you smoking a cigarette," for me to answer "because I am eighteen" would seem terribly silly. This can be paralleled to my account of moral responsibility. For someone to praise or blame someone for an action just because they are morally responsible for it would be considered unjustified or silly. So when is someone justified in praising or blaming someone for their action?

Praising and blaming an individual for her action when she could not have done otherwise is a very controversial issue. However, it is clear that one is still able to punish, and reinforce others for certain behaviors on a purely utilitarian standpoint. The point of punishment and positive and negative reinforcement is to prevent or influence another to either not perform, or to continue to perform that specific action. Even if determinism is true, one can still assume that others actions are dependable on different circumstances. For instance, I do not have to assume that my dog has the ability to do otherwise when I punish her for tearing apart my slippers. I can assume that my punishing her will have a causal role in her future actions. On this view, praise and blame can be seen as punishment and reinforcement. Thus, praise and blame serve a purpose and so their use is justified. It is proven that operant conditioning such as punishment, and positive and negative reinforcement actually does lead to behavior change so this part cannot be easily refuted.

Another way to justify praise and blame is based on emotions and causal roles. As stated earlier, emotions and reactive attitudes are important in attributing moral responsibility to people. Praising and blaming an individual can simply be seen as a reactive attitude toward an action or an individual, signaling that the person is morally responsible. To have a negative reaction toward a mass murderer for slaughtering twenty-five people is a good thing. It signals that you at least understand morality, and what they did was morally wrong. So we can keep our negative attitudes toward a person or a situation, but can a person actually *deserve* to be blamed for their action when they could not have done otherwise? Does the blamed agent deserve my negative attitude towards them?

It seems like one can always causally blame others for their actions even if they did not have the ability to do otherwise. In this sort of sense, an agent can be said to be blameworthy. For instance, I can causally blame my dog for my torn up slippers, for if she did not exist, my slippers would have remained whole. My dog is the one who tore up my slippers and so she is causally to blame for their destruction, so she is blameworthy. This concept can be applied to people as well as non-human animals.

It can be argued that this causal blameworthiness paired with our justified negative attitudes toward a person *is* what it means to blame someone for something. So, it seems we are justified in another way for praising and blaming in a deterministic world.

The debate between compatibilist and incompatibilists will no doubt continue to exist, but agents can still be held morally responsible in a deterministic world if they perform an action that is deemed morally relevant according to ordinary morality, if they want to perform that action, and their want must be brought about by their own, naturally-given reasons responsive mechanism. While an agent's being morally responsible for an event doesn't justify praise or blameworthiness, we *can* still be justified in praising and blaming others if we view praise and blame as reinforcement and punishment, or if we pair our causal blame of others with our negative attitude about that person performing that action.

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Nietzsche's Free Will Subjectivism

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In contemporary debates concerning the issue of free will, one prominent historical figure who is rarely discussed is Friedrich Nietzsche. This is understandable, since, on a casual reading, Nietzsche's views on freedom of the will seem at best obscure and at worst incoherent. Perhaps the strongest evidence for this claim comes from the famous passage in section 21 of *Beyond Good and Evil* (BGE) where Nietzsche explicitly attacks both the notions of "free will" and "unfree" will.¹ However, if one is willing to probe a little deeper, I believe that Nietzsche has some original ideas which do, in fact, make a significant contribution to the free will debate. To understand these ideas one must understand Nietzsche's motivations in writing the aforementioned passage. In denying both "free will" and "unfree will", Nietzsche is not asserting a contradiction nor is he misconstruing the notion of free will. Rather, he is (in true Nietzschean fashion) exposing and attacking the underlying psychological states that motivate these beliefs. To put it succinctly, Nietzsche is less interested in the metaphysical status of the will than he is in why people choose either to believe that they are free or that they are determined. With that said, it is my contention that Nietzsche does not hold either an incompatibilist view or a compatibilist view of free will; rather, what Nietzsche does bring to the table in the free will debate is a subjectivist theory of free will which licenses praising or blaming others in light of how their actions affect us and each other. Accordingly, this paper will be divided into three sections: First, I will analyze Nietzsche's arguments against free will. Second, I will lay out his arguments against determinism. Finally, I will sketch my arguments against a compatibilist reading, and for a subjectivist reading of Nietzsche.

Free Will

In this section I will argue that Nietzsche rejects libertarian free will. The best place to start this inquiry is with the aforementioned section 21 of BGE.

The *causa sui* is the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so far, it is a sort of rape and perversion of logic; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with just this nonsense. The desire for "freedom of the will" in the superlative metaphysical sense, which still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated; the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society involves nothing less than to be precisely this *causa sui*.²

In this passage Nietzsche makes a few assertions about the psychological state of individuals who believe that they are capable of being self-caused. While some of these assertions are meant solely to antagonize those who believe in being a *causa sui*, Nietzsche also makes two important points. First, in the opening sentence when he calls the *causa sui* a "self-contradiction" and a "perversion of logic," Nietzsche is saying that to believe oneself to be self-caused in a "superlative metaphysical" sense is to contradict human nature and thus be logically inconsistent. This is, in his words, a "perversion of logic." This sort of argument, which is underlined by Nietzsche's naturalistic world view, is presented in various other passages throughout his works. For example, In *Twilight of the Idols* (TI) he argues that "[t]he individual is in his future and past, a piece of fate, one law more, one necessity more for everything that is and everything that will be. To say to him 'change yourself' means to demand that everything should change, even in the past."^{3 4} In section 119 of *Daybreak* (D) Nietzsche states that "[h]owever far a man may

go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of *drives* which constitute his being.”⁵ The point here is that to say that persons are *causa sui* is to separate them from the world and make them into something quite unnatural. What our actions are produced by, at bottom, is nothing more than a set of natural drives that make up who we are. It is the presence of these inner drives which push us to perform actions, not some sort of otherworldly metaphysical constituent. And for Nietzsche, this unnatural separation of man from the world is a caustic side effect of Christianity. To quote section 346 of the *Gay Science* (GS): “the atrocious tactlessness of this attitude has dawned on us as such, and disgusts us; we laugh even when we find “man *and* world” put side by side, separated by the sublime ignorance of the little word “and!””⁶

The second point Nietzsche makes in this passage brings to light how moral responsibility is linked to being *causa sui*. Nietzsche notes that being “ultimately responsible for one’s actions [would] absolve God, the world, ancestry, chance, and society.” The idea here is essentially the same as above. To be able to claim moral responsibility for your actions in a libertarian sense is to somehow be able to act completely independent of any antecedents. But if this is true, then it seems that one would be acting completely independent of anything which helped shaped who one is (i.e. biological states, psychological dispositions, prior decisions, and the like). Not surprisingly, Nietzsche opposes any sort of libertarian notion of moral responsibility. For instance, in the Four Great Errors section of TI he argues that it is “the most infamous of all the arts of the theologian for making mankind ‘accountable’ in his sense of the word, that is to say for *making mankind dependent on him*.”⁷ And a bit further down: “no one *gives* a human being his qualities: not God, not society, not his parents or ancestors, not *he himself*. *No one* is accountable for existing at all, or for being constituted as he is, or for living in the circumstances and surroundings in which he lives.”⁸ We can say, then, that the notion of moral responsibility is a confusion that stems from thinking one is able to operate outside one’s natural environment, or act as a *causa sui*.

So far we have seen naturalistic arguments against both the notions of *causa sui* and moral responsibility, but this is not the only place where Nietzsche makes this sort of argument. If we look back to BGE we find another argument calling into question our phenomenological understanding of willing. This argument, which also rests on Nietzsche’s naturalism, lends support to the claim that he rejects libertarian free will. I would also like to note that I am indebted to Brian Leiter’s close reading of this passage in his paper entitled “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will”⁹ which I closely follow.

In section 19 of BGE Nietzsche begins by first identifying three specific components of one’s experience when one wills something. First, there is the sensory component which consists of “a plurality of sensations, namely, the sensation of the state “away from which,” the sensation of the state “towards which,” the sensations of this “from” and “towards” themselves, and then also an accompanying muscular sensation.”¹⁰ Here Nietzsche is describing the familiar physical sensations experienced in performing actions. So, for instance, when I am entering a classroom, I have the sensations of my legs moving in such a way as to propel me forward, my arm lifting up slightly, my hand turning the doorknob so I can enter the room, and so on. To this, Nietzsche adds a second mental component: “in every act of the will there is a ruling thought-let us not imagine it possible to sever this thought from the “willing” as if any will would then remain over!”¹¹ Nietzsche is making two claims here: first, that every action is accompanied by

a corresponding thought. While there certainly are actions which people do perform which do not have a corresponding thought (e.g. an involuntary tick or scratching one's head), for our purposes, we can take Nietzsche here to mean only actions which are accompanied by thought processes. Second, the thought process and the physical sensation are inseparably entangled with one another. The last component is the affect: "the will is not only a complex of sensation and thinking, but it is above all an affect, and specifically the affect of command."¹² It is this affect or feeling of command which is synonymous with the phenomenological sensation of free will. So to go back to the example above, when I enter the classroom, I have all the physical sensations of moving forward and opening the door; in addition to the thought "I want to enter the classroom," and it is the coalescence of a thought and sensation that produces the feeling of free will within me. This is Nietzsche's claim: A commanding thought in the mind controls the body in such and such a way and this promotes the feeling of free will.

At this point Nietzsche focuses his attention on a duality of will which exists between commanding a thought and the body's obedience. To quote the next portion of the passage:

[W]e are at the same time the commanding and the obeying parties, and as the obeying party we know the sensations of constraint, impulsion, pressure, resistance, and motion, which usually begin immediately after the act of will...on the other hand, we are accustomed to disregard this duality, and to deceive ourselves about it by means of the synthetic concept "I."¹³

When an action is committed there are two distinct sensations of will being felt; the commanding feeling, which is the sensation of a thought causing the body to commit an action, and the obeying feeling, which is the sensation of the body being caused to perform an action. But this is not how people commonly interpret their actions. Instead, the obeying sensations of the body are completely disregarded in favor of the feeling of command which is thought of as "I" (e.g. "I want to enter the classroom). But now an interesting question arises: why do we disregard the sensations of obeying? What are the features of the commanding feeling which prompt us to solely identify with them? Nietzsche provides us with an answer:

Since in the great majority of cases there has been exercise of will only when the effect of the command—that is, obedience; that is, the action—was to be expected, the appearance has translated itself into the feeling, as if there were a necessity of effect. In short, he who wills believes with a fair amount of certainty that will and action are somehow one; he ascribes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of the sensation of power which accompanies all success.¹⁴

The reason why we identify with the feeling of command rather than the feeling of obedience is the coherence between thought and action; that is, having a particular thought about doing an action (I want to enter the classroom), and my body responding with the appropriate physical motions (entering the classroom). In experiencing this coherence of thought and action, we are moved to believe that our thoughts cause our bodily actions and thus, produce the commanding feeling of willing that we call free will.

But what explains this coalescence of thought and action if not free will? Here Nietzsche gives the same sort of response that we saw in the analysis of BGE 21 above; that is, "exercising volition adds the feeling of delight to his successful executive instruments, the useful "under-wills" or under-souls—indeed, our body is but a social structure composed of many souls—to the feelings of delight as commander."¹⁵ These "under-wills" to which Nietzsche refers, can be understood as the same naturalistic drives that we saw above. What Nietzsche is saying, then, is that all of our thoughts and actions (including the feeling of willing) are part of a "social

structure” of natural drives which push us toward particular actions or goals. When “I” have the feeling that I am commanding an action, in reality the commanding feeling itself is nothing more than one of these drives pushing me toward a goal. What we are then, at bottom, is nothing more than a collection of natural drives for which any notion of an “I” that stands outside of the natural sphere is a confusion.

Determinism

Nietzsche’s attack on determinism takes place in BGE 21 and consists of two distinct arguments; the first deals with misunderstanding the necessity of causal interactions and the second calls into question the psychology behind espousing this sort of view. To begin with the causality issue:

“[U]nfree will,” which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect. One should not wrongly reify “cause” and “effect,” as the natural scientists do, according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press and push until it “effects” the end; one should use “cause” and “effect” only as pure concepts, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and communication-*not* for explanation. In the “in-itself” there is nothing of “causal connections,” of “necessity,” or of “psychological non-freedom”; there the effect does *not* follow the cause, there is no rule of “law.”¹⁶

Determinism is a misunderstanding of cause and effect; that is, there is nothing in our empirical understanding of the world that allows us to be privy to the particulars of being determined to (or not to) perform an action. Here Nietzsche seems to be holding an antirealist view of causation. By saying that cause and effect are nothing more than “conventional fictions,” Nietzsche means that there is no objective truth about causation. The only purpose cause and effect serve is to aid in “designating” events and “communicating” those events to others. *Prima facie* this is an odd sounding argument. Surely there are instances of cause and effect in which we do see an objective causal order. When I feel hungry and make myself a sandwich, is there not, at least, a “rough outline”¹⁷ of an objective causal order present, which I would be privy to? Why then, should we not infer that at least in some sense, we can possess knowledge of objective causal interactions? Here it will help to look at GS 112:

We call it “explanation,” but it is “description” that differentiates us from older phases of knowledge and science. We describe better; we explain no more than those who came before... In each case, the sequence of “causes” stands before us more completely, and we infer that such and such must first precede so that the other thing may follow-but with this, we have *comprehended* nothing at all. Quality-for instance, in every chemical process-appears, both now and earlier, as a “miracle,” as does every locomotion; nobody has “explained” thrust.¹⁸

Nietzsche’s point here is that regardless of how well we may be able to describe causal processes, these descriptions do nothing to explain them. Rather, these descriptions allow us to make inferences between a supposed cause and effect that we treat as objective truths. This follows Hume’s famous problem of induction. According to Hume, knowledge that is not based on present perceptions or memory must be based on a causal relationship, and these causal relationships can only be known by an inference from past experiences which cannot be rationally justified.¹⁹ Nietzsche points out two examples from the fields of chemistry and

physics to make his point; various chemical processes and locomotion can be described, but as for an explanation, they both still seem to remain “miracles” to science.

Regardless of what modern science now says about chemistry, locomotion, or any of the other theories that Nietzsche explicitly denied (e.g. the atom and Darwinism), there is an underlying theme here which is of importance to his argument against determinism. What these sorts of un-knowable scientific arguments rely on, according to Nietzsche, is a metaphysical belief in objective truth. To quote GS 345:

One can see that even science rests upon a faith; there is no such thing as a science that is “free of suppositions.” The question of whether *truth* is needed must not only have been answered “yes” in advance, but must have been answered “yes” with such force that in this affirmation there is expressed the proposition, the faith, the conviction, “there is *nothing needed more* than truth, and in comparison to it, everything else has only secondary value...our faith in science rests upon a *metaphysical faith*; that even we knowers of today, we godless ones and anti-metaphysicians, still take even *our* fire from the flame first lit by a faith thousands of years old...that God is truth, that truth is divine.²⁰

Here Nietzsche is arguing that in order for science to be able to say anything at all, it has to assume there is some objective truth or fact of the matter. But if truth is what science is searching for (i.e. the objective fact of the matter), then it seems science has to assume what it is trying to prove, and thus, begs the question. The point here is that our attitudes and actions should not be beholden to, or bound by any alleged objective metaphysics. Instead of God with his free will and objective truths, we now have science with its “cause and effect,” and “unfree” will. There is no good reason to believe one over the other and also no good reason to believe either one to begin with. This, then, is Nietzsche’s problem with determinism; it is based on the same sort of objective metaphysical ideal as libertarianism, and as such, should be rejected.

With Nietzsche’s argument against causality laid out, we can now turn to the psychological reasons for being a determinist. To quote again from BGE 21:

[T]he “unfreedom of the will” is regarded as a problem from two entirely opposite standpoints...some will not give up their “responsibility,” their belief in *themselves*... Others...do not wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything, and owing to an inward self-contempt, seek to *lay the blame for themselves somewhere else*.²¹

Nietzsche’s problem with psychological dispositions in this passage comes in two varieties. First are those who will not give up their “responsibility.” Here I take Nietzsche to be referring to those who would reject determinism. These would be proponents of libertarianism and we have seen the arguments against them above. Second, are those who “do not wish to be answerable for anything.” These would be the “natural scientists” whom Nietzsche criticized above for their “faith” in truth. In believing in the “mechanical doltishness” of determinism, they will shirk being “answerable” for their actions and blame everything negative about themselves on the causal process of nature. Nietzsche’s worry here is that belief in determinism entails giving up being blameworthy and this would lead people to doing whatever they want without fear of being held accountable.

This, then, is Nietzsche’s view on determinism: it is a mistaken view which is based on metaphysical beliefs that cannot be grounded in anything more concrete than faith. Nevertheless, there are those who do believe the plausibility of determinism either because they

think that they can somehow still stand outside their relation to nature, or because they do not want to be held accountable and see determinism as being the perfect solution to their dilemma.

Subjectivism

So far we have seen Nietzsche completely reject the two views which fall under the banner of incompatibilism. This might lead one to believe that what Nietzsche really had in mind (at least implicitly) was closer to a compatibilist view. According to compatibilism, persons can still be free and morally responsible even if their actions are determined. Now, according to the compatibilist, one can still be free in one's actions because "free" simply means acting in accordance with one's desires; and these desires must exist without certain kinds of outer constraints or inner compulsions. This is an interesting way to interpret Nietzsche and scholars such as Robert Solomon,²² Nel Grillaert,²³ and John Richardson²⁴ have all suggested this interpretation. However, in my opinion, it is problematic to classify Nietzsche as a compatibilist for two reasons. First, Nietzsche (to the best of my knowledge) never explicitly says anything that would count as a compatibilist view. Second, compatibilism as a doctrine does not seem to mesh with Nietzsche's stark anti-metaphysical view. I shall examine each issue in turn.

Throughout Nietzsche's corpus I have yet to run across anything that even seems remotely to suggest that Nietzsche was sympathetic toward compatibilism. First let us remember what the key motivation for espousing a compatibilist view is: namely to find people morally responsible despite living in a determined world. Now, as we have seen from the passages quoted above, moral responsibility, for Nietzsche, is linked to the notion of *causa sui*. This is especially apparent in the TI passage on page two which seems to be a very condensed version of the consequence argument. But this does not seem to be the language of someone who espouses compatibilist sympathies. In response to this, the passage which is pointed out as a textual basis for compatibilist motivations appears in *Genealogy of Morality* (GM), II, 2 in which Nietzsche does speak positively of responsibility. I, however, disagree with this analysis and shall argue below that what this passage really manifests is Nietzsche's subjectivist theory of free will. For now I simply want to point out the passage as one which is used to justify compatibilist sympathies.

As we have seen throughout the previous two sections of this paper, Nietzsche is not sympathetic to anything which might be called metaphysical. Nietzsche's arguments against libertarianism hinge on notions of *causa sui* being unnatural and unintelligible. Likewise, his argument against determinism rests on causal interactions being a misunderstanding by scientists who cling to metaphysical notions of truth in the same manner as the religious man clings to god. So then what of compatibilism? Does this thesis fall in the metaphysical category? Well first it would be helpful to have a clear definition of the term metaphysics: the philosophical study whose object is to determine the real nature of things—to determine the meaning, structure, and principles of whatever is insofar as it is.²⁵ Now let us ask: What is it the compatibilist is trying to do? Well the goal of compatibilism is an attempted solution to the free will problem. And the free will problem, as it is traditionally understood, concerns the real nature of a thing; that is, whether human beings possess the ability to make a free choice. So along this line of thought, compatibilism would indeed fall under the category of metaphysics. But if this is the case, then it would not be fair to ascribe compatibilism to Nietzsche since he is so vehemently opposed to metaphysical views. Now that I have laid out what I observe to be difficulties with referring to

Nietzsche as a compatibilist, I want to switch gears and sketch an outline of a subjective view of free will which I do think represents Nietzsche's actual thoughts on the subject.

Before we can properly dig into the text to understand why Nietzsche holds a subjectivist view of free will, we must first define exactly what it is we are talking about. Subjectivism about free will differs from other theories in that the subjectivist maintains that there is no objective fact of the matter concerning freedom and moral responsibility. Instead, the subjectivist thinks that all we are doing when we say an action is free, or a person is morally responsible, is expressing our attitudes about that action, and these attitudes do not correspond to any sort of objective truth. In this way the entire question about the truth or falsity of free will becomes a moot point, since, in the words of Richard Double: "If moral judgments in general are neither true nor false, it follows that statements such as "Caused choices are compatible (or incompatible) with free will and moral responsibility" are neither true nor false. They would be merely emotional responses to determinism."²⁶ Now, when one holds a libertarian view, they are doing nothing more than voicing their strong aversion to determinism, a compatibilist is voicing their partial acceptance of determinism, and a determinist is announcing their full-fledged approval of the view. However, a person does not have to strictly hold to compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions. This is, perhaps, the greatest strength of the subjectivist position; since there is no "right" answer, one can oscillate between compatibilism and incompatibilism (or libertarianism and determinism) and still remain completely consistent. One is not required to adhere to any single view.

So far we have seen examples throughout Nietzsche's work where he talks negatively of both libertarian and determined views. He does, however, have some positive things to say about both free will and responsibility. To see this, we must examine the previously alluded to GM II, 2:

The "free" man, the possessor of a protracted and unbreakable will, also possesses his *measure of value*: looking out upon others from himself, he honors or he despises; and just as he is bound to honor his peers, the strong and reliable...he is bound to reserve a kick for the feeble windbags who promise without the right to do so, and a rod for the liar who breaks his word even at the moment he utters it. The proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege of *responsibility*, the consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate, has in his case penetrated to the profoundest depths and become instinct, the dominating instinct.²⁷

Nietzsche expresses two distinct ideas here: First, the "free" man judges those around him against himself. He finds some of those people to be "strong and reliable" as he is and holds them in high esteem. Others he finds to be "feeble windbags" and "liars" who deserve scorn. But what is important here is not who this man respects or despises, but rather the fact that Nietzsche refers to him as a "free" man. What is it about this man that makes him freer than others (namely those whom he despises)? According to Nietzsche, what makes this person free is that he has overcome the "morality of mores" to become an "emancipated individual, with the actual *right* to make promises, this master of a *free* will, this sovereign individual."²⁸ Setting aside questions concerning the credibility of Nietzsche's moral claims, what is of importance for our purposes, is the presence of somebody whom Nietzsche regards as being free. The fact that this person embraces Nietzsche's ideals is enough to grant him or her freedom and the ability to judge others for their beliefs. But is this not the same manner in which a subjectivist goes about ascribing value judgments concerning freedom? In ascribing free will to the person who adheres to his moral thesis (and conversely in denying free will to those who do not), Nietzsche is stating

his approval (and disapproval) of the moral choice a person makes. In doing this, Nietzsche is aligning himself with an account of freedom for which there can be no objective measure.

The second idea in this passage deals with what it means to be a free and responsible individual. This entails possessing a “power over oneself and over fate” which becomes a “dominating instinct.” Here Nietzsche is again touching on his naturalistic views by referring to the capacity to possess freedom as being contingent on instinct. The ability to utilize one’s natural abilities to be “liberated...from [the] morality of customs, [to be] autonomous and supramoral (for “autonomous” and “moral” are mutually exclusive), in short, the man who has his own independent, protracted will and the *right to make promises*.”²⁹ A precursor to this thought can also be seen in GS 347 where Nietzsche states that “one could conceive of a pleasure and strength in self-determination, a *freedom* of the will in which a spirit takes its leave of every faith.”³⁰ The point here is that freedom and responsibility are solely dependent upon a person being naturally strong enough to overcome everyday (i.e. Christian) morality in favor of choosing a new set of morals. But again, as above, this is a subjective view of free will. In relying on an individual’s strength and moral stance as criteria for free will and responsibility, Nietzsche is changing the free will question from “Can I do otherwise?” or “Am I responsible?” to “Am I choosing the proper ethical theory to adhere to?” or perhaps to put it in a more Nietzschean fashion “Am I well enough endowed in my nature (i.e. as a human being) to rise against what is commonly taken to be moral in favor of a schema which promotes a strong nature?” And both of these latter questions are subjective in nature. Barring any sort of belief in objective morality (which Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical view indeed does) there is no proper criterion for judging what sort of moral beliefs one should hold outside of what they think is correct; and it is along this subjectivist line of thought that Nietzsche can hold a person responsible for a free action. At bottom, then, all that free will is for Nietzsche is an emotional response to those who embrace his philosophy which consists of embracing their natural superiority and basing their ethics on that superiority.

Conclusion

So what are the advantages of subscribing to this subjectivist interpretation of Nietzschean free will? Well I think Nietzsche points them out in BGE 21. First, the notion of being *causa sui* is quite mysterious. This is perhaps the toughest question any libertarian has to answer about the nature of free will. How is it possible that I can break the natural causal chain of the universe to perform the actions which I wish to? This sort of metaphysical question can be tossed out on the subjectivist reading. Second, even if the world is determined, we do not want others treating that fact as an excuse for doing whatever they wish to. We still want a way of telling others that what they are doing has an effect on those around them. Subjectivism gives us that ability without the added baggage or “mechanical doltishness” of determinism. Third, Nietzsche’s attack on causation shows his anti-realist and anti-metaphysical roots. There are no objective scientific truths since those truths have to be faith based, and as Nietzsche has pointed out on multiple occasions, there is no good reason to take anything on faith. If, then, we are to take Nietzsche seriously and be faithful to his ideas, then we must ascribe to him a subjectivist view of free will rather than any other view of free will, compatibilist or incompatibilist.

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Notes

¹ Here it would help to define some terms in contemporary philosophical language. First, when Nietzsche refers to either free or unfree will he is speaking of incompatibilist versions of free will. Incompatibilists maintain that free will and determinism cannot coexist. When Nietzsche refers to free will in this context, it is libertarian free will that he is concerned with. Libertarianism holds that there are free actions that occur uncaused or undetermined. By contrast, unfree will can be taken to mean the position known as hard determinism. According to this view, there are no uncaused events and, therefore, free will does not exist.

² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Sect. 21.

³ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, "Morality as Anti-Nature," sect. 6.

⁴ This actually appears to be a tightly condensed statement of the consequence argument for incompatibilism. According to the argument, all of our present actions are necessary consequences of our past actions combined with the laws of nature; and if free will requires the power to choose between alternative actions, then we do not possess free will.

⁵ Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, sect. 119.

⁶ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, sect. 346.

⁷ Nietzsche, "The Four Great Errors," *Twilight of the Idols*, sect. 7.

⁸ Nietzsche, "The Four Great Errors," *Twilight of the Idols*, sect. 8.

⁹ Brian Leiter, "Nietzsche's Theory of the Will," *Philosophers' Imprint*, Vol. 7, no. 7, 2007.

¹⁰ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, sect. 19.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, sect. 21.

¹⁷ I say "rough outline" here because in an actual instance of "being hungry" and "making a sandwich" there would be a complex structure of causal interactions encompassing both the mental and the physical, for instance, the feeling of emptiness in my stomach sending a signal to my brain which would in turn translate into the thought "I am hungry." This would lead to neural impulses being sent to my muscles to initiate movement, etc.

¹⁸ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, sect. 112.

¹⁹ Georges Dicker, *Hume's Epistemology and Metaphysics, an Introduction*, pg. 61.

²⁰ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, sect. 345.

²¹ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, sect. 21.

²² Robert Solomon, "Nietzsche on Fatalism and "Free Will,"" *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, no. 23, 2002.

²³ Nel Grillaert, "Determining One's Fate: A Delineation of Nietzsche's Conception of Free Will," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, no. 31, 2006.

²⁴ John Richardson, "Nietzsche's Freedom," *Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy*.

²⁵ "metaphysics," *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

²⁶ Richard Double, *Beginning Philosophy*, pg. 209.

²⁷ Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morality*, essay 2, sect. 2.

²⁸ ibid

²⁹ ibid

³⁰ Nietzsche, *Gay Science*, sect. 347.

Introduction to Hume's Influence
Frank Mann

Descartes has been referred to by many as the father of modern philosophy and was the first of three influential rationalists in the modern period. Following in his footsteps were Leibniz and Spinoza, who formulated their own rationalist accounts of knowledge. Rationalism, crudely defined, is the stance that reason should stand as the foundation for certainty in knowledge. In the 17th and 18th century the rationalist tradition came to a pause and empiricism, motivated by the rise of experimental science, came to center stage. Empiricism is the stance that all knowledge is derived from sensation and experience and was thoroughly expounded by John Locke and George Berkeley. David Hume, following Locke and Berkeley, was also an empiricist, however, instead of yielding a robust system of knowledge he simply ruined the tea party for, this caricatured rendition of, his predecessors. Hume developed a stance called skepticism, which cast doubt on the ability to possess knowledge. This is most likely why Bertrand Russell, in *The History of Western Philosophy*, famously states that Hume's thought marks a dead end in philosophy. In the following, I will examine several sections of *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, one of Hume's most influential works, in order to shed light on how he established his skepticism and created a sort of dead end in philosophy.

The *Enquiry* was not Hume's first publication; in fact, most of the principles and theories in the *Enquiry* were set out in a work titled *The Treatise of Human Nature*. All three volumes of the *Treatise* were written before Hume left college and were originally published anonymously. Many critiques have been made of Hume's work and many of them focus on what is written in the *Treatise*, which Hume seemed to have published hastily. While the *Treatise* is substantially longer than the *Enquiry*, many of its key points are succinctly summarized within its text. Therefore, for the sake of ease and to avoid interpretational discrepancy, I will focus solely on what is written in the *Enquiry*.

With that said, it is worth mentioning that within section I, titled "Of the Different Species of Philosophy," Hume defends a particular type of philosophy, reason based philosophy, from various attacks. Although for the purpose of this paper, reviewing these arguments is uncalled for. Furthermore, it is safe to assume that reason based philosophy, no matter how recondite, provides accuracy and clarity to an equal if not greater degree than most other disciplines and should be held with high regard.

Confident that the reader will acquiesce to this branch of reason based philosophy, Hume continues to Sect. II, titled "Of the Origin of Ideas". This section is of the utmost importance, for in it Hume presents his principle of empiricism as well as his theory of (or test for) meaning. Hume first sets out to classify perceptions, which represent any conscious state whatsoever. He insists that all perceptions consist of impressions of sensation, impression of reflection and ideas. Impressions of sensation are any direct experience obtained through the senses, for instance, color, hot, cold, etc. Impressions of reflection are obtained through self-examination or introspection and could include joy, sadness, anger, desire, etc. Ideas, on the other hand, are any conscious state other than an impression, for example, memories, concepts, mental images, etc. Hume further distinguishes impressions from ideas by pointing out that impressions are

lively, vivid and forcible, while ideas are faint and dull. This provides the official criterion for distinguishing impressions from ideas.

Hume then continues by claiming that most believe that human thought is utterly unbound. He asks us to imagine a poor man becoming rich over night, or a peasant becoming a king. He then claims that the above assumption is incorrect and that all the mind amounts to is the ability to compound, transpose, augment, and diminish what the senses and experience provide us. This leads to Hume's famous principle of empiricism, which states that every idea is either derived from a corresponding impression or composed of simpler ideas, each of which is derived from a corresponding impression. Two arguments are given to support this principle. First, it is claimed that the principle is sound simply because a counter example cannot be contrived, and Hume challenges the reader to do so. Next he insists that a man who cannot have some kind of sensation will also lack the corresponding idea (so, a man born blind will have no idea of color). However, immediately after this argument he presents a counter example commonly referred to as the missing shade, or the particular shade of blue. The reader is asked to imagine a color line that ranges from the darkest to lightest shade of blue; although, at some point within the line there is a particular shade of blue that is missing. Hume concludes that even if a man had never experienced this particular shade of blue, he would still be able to have an idea of the missing shade by inferring what would fall in between the previous shade and the upcoming shade. However, he quickly concludes that the example is so singular that it is hardly worth our observing and does not provide good reason for altering his general principle. But is this fair? Couldn't similar arguments be applied to all five senses, if the appropriately corresponding impression had never been experienced? If so, it seems that there would be at least five counter examples, not one.

Nevertheless, from the combination of Hume's Principle of Empiricism and his criterion for distinguishing impressions from ideas, he derives his theory of (or test for) meaning. This theory is quite significant because it is used in later sections to cast doubt on a wide variety of notions, which bolster and perpetuate skeptical concerns. With that said, Hume states that whenever we are suspicious that a word or term is employed without any meaning, all we need to do is ask: from what impression is that supposed idea derived? If it is impossible to assign any impression to the term in question then it may be concluded that the term is meaningless.

In section IV, titled "Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding," Hume classifies all the objects of human reason into two groups: relations of ideas and matters of fact. Relations of ideas include the disciplines of geometry, algebra and arithmetic and are typically considered to consist of analytic truths, or in other words, various propositions that truth can be understood merely by grasping the meaning of words and the relations they possess with one another (for example, the fact that a bachelor is an unmarried man). Matters of fact include anything other than relations of ideas, including any claims concerning the external world (such as the sun will rise tomorrow, or when my hand is too near to flame I feel pain).

Similar to how the objects of human reasoning fall into two categories, Hume insists that all of our reasoning falls into two categories as well. First, there is demonstrative reasoning, or reasoning concerning relations of ideas. Second, there is factual reasoning, or reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence. Matters of fact,

however, cannot be known with the same degree of certainty as relations of ideas, for the contrary of such matters never imply a contradiction. Hume states that our knowledge of matters of fact are not attained by reasoning a priori but arise from *experience*, when we find objects constantly conjoined with each other; past experience gives us direct and certain information to those particular objects in the precise period of time in which they occurred. But from that point forward, there is then a consequence drawn by the mind, and this inference needs to be explained. For it may be true that, “I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect.” Although, how are we to justify the further inference that, “I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects?”¹

Hume then discusses whether or not this inference, or in other words, induction can be rationally justified. Induction is the process of inferring a general law or principle (very often about particular instances) from particular instances. Hume begins his critique by pointing out the fact that any argument taking the following form is deductively invalid:

There is an A event

Therefore there will be a B event

However, Hume notices and points out that such an argument can be made valid by adding only one simple premise:

If there is an A event, then there will be a B event.

While the addition of this premise makes the previous argument valid, the additional premise itself is inferred from past experience, or in other words, the additional premise is inferred from the fact that past A events have always been followed by B events. However at this point, one may begin to notice the circularity present; while the initial argument is made valid by depositing an additional premise, that additional premise is established from an unjustified, invalid inference (that goes as follows):

Past A events have always been followed by B events

Therefore if there is an A event, there will be a B event

Hume argues that such an inference cannot be assumed because it is perfectly conceivable, and entails no logical contradiction, that an entirely new and unexpected effect follows a cause. Hume insists that such an inference can only be assumed as legitimate if, once again, another premise can be established, mainly that: the future will resemble (or will behavior qualitatively similar to) the past. However, instead of this premise saving the day, it is here that Hume brings together his critique of induction by claiming that such a necessary premise cannot be established in any satisfactory manner. He points out that “the future will resemble the past” cannot be established demonstratively because its negation does not imply a contradiction. He then insists that

¹ David Hume. *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principle of Morals*. 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, 1975 p.34

“the future will resemble the past” cannot be established inductively because to inductively establish such a premise an inductive inference is needed (that the future has always resembled the past), and therefore would use induction in order to justify induction, which is obviously circular. So he concludes that induction cannot be justified demonstratively or inductively, and therefore cannot be rationally justified at all.

At this point, I believe it is worthwhile to point out that Hume, within section V of the Enquiry, does speak of custom or habit stating, “Custom, then, is the great guide of human life.”² When Hume speaks of custom or habit he seems to be expressing the view that relying on induction is something that is instinctual, and something that is impossible for us to refrain from using. Custom or habit can be easily understood as a psychological principle that states if we have always observed A events to be followed by B events, then we come to expect B events upon observing or experiencing A events. However, this principle of custom *does not* imply that we’re *rationally justified* in believing that future A events will be followed by future B events (because past A events have always been followed by past B events), but rather that we *can’t help but believe* that future A events will be followed by future B events. By speaking of habit Hume provides a sort of pragmatic justification for the use of induction, mainly that we can’t help but use it, and its use leads to desirable outcomes. However, Hume fails to provide an epistemic justification for its use, so at the end of the day, Hume concludes that the medium that enables inductive inferences to be made through a chain of reasoning is beyond his comprehension. Furthermore, he concludes that any argument meant to put trust in past experience must be probable and that such arguments are circular and take for granted the very point in question.

Further skeptical concerns are raised in section VII, titled “Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion”. Hume points out that the chief difficulty with advancing in the science of human nature is the obscurity of the ideas and the ambiguity of the terms that are often used. For even some of the simplest ideas and terms possess ambiguity and obscurity. For example, no terms are more difficult to analyze than: power, force, energy, or necessary connection. When even these terms are vague and indefinite what are we to do? Hume claims that we ought to produce the original impression or sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. Thus, Hume begins searching for the impressions that power and necessary connection are copied from. He states that they cannot be found in cause and effect nor found in our experience of bodies. They also cannot be found in sensible qualities of objects (like solidity, extension, or motion, for these qualities are complex themselves). Hume then entertains the possibility that they are copied from ideas of reflection, particularly reflections on the operation of our own mind and how it can command movement in the body. However, he quickly rejects this possibility for a number of reasons. First, the principle of the mind/body union is one of the most mysterious and subsequently cannot be the impression that is the source of such a simple idea. Second, if we were conscious of this power we would be able to answer why we can influence the tongue and fingers but not the heart and liver. At any rate, what is of importance is that it is concluded that power and necessary connection fail the test for meaning developed in section II. Therefore, according to Hume, it must be concluded that

² David Hume. *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principle of Morals*. 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, 1975 p.44

these words are meaningless. All that can be said is that events follow one another and are associated with one another.

Hume continues his skeptical critiques in later sections, although for the purpose of this paper, I believe the point has been adequately demonstrated. Hume successfully called into question our ability to attain knowledge from the seemingly inextricable process of inductive reasoning. If he was also successful in calling into doubt rudimentary concepts such as power, force, energy, and necessary connection, it is easy to understand why the influence and significance of his work may be parodied with ruining a tea party or marking a sort of intellectual dead end.

But where does one go from here? How is one to assuage or mitigate Hume's skepticism? First off, one may fast-forward to Kant, who is often considered the first to surpass the dead end Hume marked in philosophy. Though setting aside Kant's transcendental idealism, which I do not have time to give due consideration, what can be said of Hume's skepticism? Are there any flaws in Hume's skeptical weaponry that may allay one's worries? I believe a problem lies in Hume's complete and obstinate adherence to empiricism, for it is not at all clear that Hume can provide an empiricist account of concept formation. He believes that all conscious states whatsoever, including concepts, are made of impressions, simple ideas and/or complex ideas. He holds that any meaningful term is derived from some corresponding impression, so concepts themselves are copied from impressions. However, the formation of concepts by means of copying impressions is competence presupposing. Therefore, the mind would necessarily require some sort of disposition or mechanism by which concepts could be copied from impression in order to be formed. But Hume's stubborn and unrestricted adherence to empiricism does not grant the mind any innate dispositions so it seems that Hume would be unable to provide an empiricist account of concept formation while strictly adhering to what is required for the development of his skeptical arguments. Therefore, in light of the above concern, one may breathe a sigh of relief; for Hume needs to qualify his empiricist stance and thus potentially undermine his skeptical stance.

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A Formal Argument Against the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Alexander T. Stubberfield

Did our universe have a personal creator? An excellent example of an argument which seeks to answer this question is the *Kalam* Cosmological Argument (KCA) as outlined by William Lane Craig, in a book entitled, God? A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist. It will be the goal of this paper to give a brief exposition of the argument and subject it to a rigorous critical examination after which I intend to prove, beyond doubt, that the argument tells us nothing with regard to the creation of the universe or if it had a personal creator.

The *Kalam* argument as espoused by Craig is a very simple and compact argument containing only two premises and a conclusion. It is:

KP1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.

KP2) The universe began to exist.

KC1) Therefore, the universe has a cause. (Craig p.5)

Its simplicity is its greatest advantage and on the face of it, it looks to be correct. However, it has a fatal flaw – its first premise.

One of Craig's opponents, a philosopher by the name of Wes Morriston makes the flaw of the argument take on flesh when he draws the distinction between two types of coming to be. He outlines and names these two types of coming into existence in a paper entitled "Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?: A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument," he writes:

- 1) X exists at a time T, and there is a time prior to T at which X does not exist.
- 2) X exists at time T, and there is no time prior to T. (Morriston p.154)

I shall refer to the first of these possibilities as *intratemporal* "coming to be," and to the second as *extratemporal* "coming to be."

This is a very important distinction to be made for the purposes of the KCA in that the conclusion would imply the very beginning of space-time itself. Morriston hashes it out further:

In order to provide what is needed for the *Kalam* argument, premise (1) must be understood to claim that anything that comes to be in *either* of these senses must have a cause. But principle (WT)¹ entails only that whatever comes to be *within* time must have a cause, leaving open the question what is to be said about the beginning of time itself. (Morriston p.154)

If this objection holds it would seem a massive hurdle for the KCA and possibly spell its death. To understand the objection we must think clearly about the beginning of space-time itself and how this relates to our very notions of causality (discussed in a moment).

Craig attempts to maneuver around this objection. He tries to assert that this principle is a synthetic *a priori* assumption and that the denial of it is absurd.

¹ See page 153 of Morriston.

It would seem, then, that “metaphysical intuition,” as Craig conceives it, is a source of knowledge that is both synthetic and a priori. In this paper, I will not challenge the claim that there are *some* synthetic a priori intuitions. I will ask only whether, assuming that there are, it is plausible to believe that premise (1) of the *Kalam* argument is among them. (Morrison p.156)

Craig simply denies that this objection holds and merit and does not in any way damage the KCA. He is gravely mistaken. In what follows I shall show you, dear reader, that when we are discussing the very beginnings of time, our notions of causality cannot stand and that through Morrison’s distinction, the *Kalam* argument fails.

It is important at this point to understand what we mean when we say that the first premise is *a priori*. In order to illustrate this, I can think of no better sources than Immanuel Kant in his work *The Critique of Pure Reason* and Sebastian Gardner in his book *Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant writes:

...knowledge absolutely independent of all experience. (Kant B3)

and

Any knowledge that professes to hold *a priori* lays claim to be regarded as absolutely necessary. (Kant AXV)

To spell it out further, I think it is fair to supplement Kant’s definitions with Gardner’s who wrote: “...to refer to conceptual elements in cognition which we bring to experience and which are not derived from it- in Kant’s language, ‘a priori’ conceptual elements.” (Gardner 23) So, this knowledge must be something that is already held in our consciousness which we have not learned from the outer world. It also must be absolutely necessary as a pre-condition of our experience. Kant believes that both our concepts of space and time are necessarily *a priori*. He writes:

Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences. For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is to something in another region of space from which I find myself,) and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another and accordingly as not only different but in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed. The representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically derived from the relations of outer appearance. On the contrary, this outer experience is itself possible at all only through that representation. (Kant B38)

It is essential to see here that Kant believes that without this representation, we could not possibly have experience. He seems to be correct as well, for without space; in our modern terms space-time, it would seem impossible for us to be able to experience anything much less exist ourselves. If Kant is right, then it seems there will be a huge problem for the KCA in that we cannot conceive of causality without our representation of space-time.

Space-time is the necessary condition of our experience. Without it, we cannot have any notion of causality. Events and objects within our experience all exist within space-time. The second premise of the KCA admits that there was a time before space-time in that it states the universe had a beginning. If something begins to exist, then there must have been a time before it existed. Indeed the second premise seems to be irrefutable. If this is the case, then we must accept that there was a time when the universe was not. In which case, there must have been a time when space-time was not and therefore, we cannot have any notions of causality because we cannot have any idea

of how things would come to be. Morrision's distinction seems to be correct and important in that *extratemporally*, space-time does not exist. The truthfulness of the first premise of the KCA cannot be known and actually seems to be false in the *extratemporal* sense.

Without our notions of causality, how can we possibly know anything at all? It seems that the object in front of me causes the event of my perceiving that object and the knowledge that the object is in front of me. In this *intratemporal* sense it seems intelligible for me to ask, "what caused this object in front of me?" But it is unintelligible for me to think that I can apply this same concept of causality to a case in which there is no possibility of causality, namely, a time when there was no space-time. To further represent this distinction I will provide a proof:

Formal Proof Against The Kalam Cosmological Argument:

The Kalam Cosmological Argument:

KP1) *Whatever begins to exist has a cause.*

KP2) *The universe began to exist.*

KC1) *Therefore, the universe has a cause.*

Objection:

We cannot conceive of any sort of causality before the universe as the universe is the necessary condition for causality in the form of Space-time. Therefore, (KP1) cannot be known making the whole argument unsound.

Argument:

P1) If causality, then space-time.

P2) If space-time, then the universe.

C1) Ergo, if causality, then the universe.

P3) If before the universe, then not the universe.

P4) Before the universe.

C2) Ergo, not the universe.

C3) Ergo, not causality.

Formal Proof:

Let P = Causality

Let Q = Space-time

Let R = The Universe

Let T = Before the Universe

- 1) $P \supset Q$
- 2) $Q \supset R$
-
- 3) $\therefore P \supset R$ (1,2 HS)
- 4) $T \supset \sim R$
- 5) T
- 6) $\sim R$ (4,5 MP)
-
- 7) $\therefore \sim P$ (3,6 MT)

If this proof is right; and indeed it seems to be, then the *Kalam* Cosmological argument seems to fail when we introduce thoughts of causality. My one weakness seems to be my first premise. Is causality dependent upon space-time? Is causality a characteristic of space-time and therefore the universe? It seems that to deny this premise is absurd. If space-time and causality are not linked in this way, then I would simply ask how; if it were not for space-time, you are reading this paper. Our representation of space-time is *a priori* it seems absurd to deny that thought – as Kant writes:

Space is a necessary *a priori* representation, which underlies all outer intuitions. We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think of it as empty of objects. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent on them. It is an *a priori* representation which necessarily underlies our outer appearances. (Kant A24/B39)

At first glance, the *Kalam* Cosmological Argument is convincing. Its simplicity and reliance on our every day notions of causality enchant the reader into a false sense of security. Morrision was correct in thinking that there are two types of “coming to be,” the KCA wishes to draw its first premise from our *intratemporal* understanding of things. However, it cannot justifiably use this first premise in the *extratemporal* sense that it must for its conclusion. As we have seen, it is not possible to simply deny this distinction with a wave of the hand. Our very notions of causality rely on an *intratemporal* existence but we cannot justifiably assume that all cases, *intratemporally* and *extratemporally*, that these notions will hold. Indeed it seems impossible to muster an understanding of causality without space-time. If we are to agree with Kant; as I think we should, then Craig’s argument cannot be true and by the very basis of its first premise, should be thrown out.

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