In his book *The Problem of Perception*, A.D. Smith offers a novel defense of direct realism against the arguments from illusion and from hallucination. His phenomenologically-based critique of the former invokes perceptual constancy in order to deny that in cases like seeing objects from an angle, the objects appear other than they are. I argue that while the appeal to constancy is illuminating, it does not cover all cases and needs to be supplemented by the standard critique of the sense-datum inference. Smith’s interesting version of the argument from hallucination is essentially that (a) in hallucination one is aware of a non-normal object and (b) the prolongation of the causal chain that occurs in veridical perception does not eliminate that object. His critique of the argument invokes nonexistent intentional objects. I argue that an adverbial theory of sensing deals with the argument better than Smith’s theory of nonexistent objects.
|Presenter:||Georges Dicker (Faculty)|
|Time:||1:15 pm (Session III)|